Intramural recriminations

Cherry-picking the first subparagraph does indeed make it sound rather innocuous. But when you look at the entirety of section 1314, it's very definitely micro-managing. The bit you quote requires the secretary of defense to provide a "report" before being able to actually use a very large chunk of the appropriation. "Report" doesn't sound like much, right? Well, this report requires the Secretary to provide "individual transition readiness assessments of Iraq and Afghan security forces." With monthly updates through Oct. 2008. Requiring that detailed of a report, with regular updates, is indeed "micromanaging." One doesn't need that level of detail unless one wants to quibble with the details, and quibbling with the details is micromanaging. Whether it's a formal order or simply pulling the Secretary and the generals up to Capitol Hill to be grilled under oath for hours, when they should be busy fighting the war, is micromanaging. Note, by the way, that the Secretary must provide this report to 4 separate congressional committees, each of which may decide to hold its own hearings and interrogations.

To make the micromanaging even clearer, subsection (c) requires a report from OMB... and again, the initial report must be filed BEFORE 50% of the appropriated funds can actually be spent. The OMB report doesn't just ask for readiness reports, it wants reports on the "proposed uses" of all funds on a "project-by-project basis," including estimates by the (military) commanders of the costs to complete each project. If it's not micromanaging, why would they need to see a report of proposed uses of the money? Asking for proposed uses, with project-by-project estimates, is done only if one wants to, again, quibble about the details... the definition of micro-managing.

And in subsection (d) of section 1314, the Secretary of Defense must again notify Congress (4 committees) if he wants any new projects above $15 million. That doesn't technically require Congressional approval, but it is, in the real world of Washington, DC, a "mother-may-I" provision. If the Secretary notifies the committees of a new project, and they go "tsk, tsk," only a real fool would continue with that project. And much as it may be to us everyday folks, $15 million is absolute peanuts in the scale of this war and the reconstruction costs. Talk about adding delays. $15 million is a micro-detail, and thus the pre-implementation requirement of notice is micro-managing.

Sections 1901 and 1902 continue the micro-managing, seeking to impose what it claims are DoD policies via legislation. Congress probably has the power to do this under the "make rules" provision in the Constitution, but it should do so directly, not through conditional appropriations. And these are unwise, anyway. They're designed to sound real good, but in fact put severe limits on the President's ability to deploy military units as he sees fits.

Section 1901 prohibits deployment of any unit not certified as "fully mission capable," unless the President swears to Congress that it's really, really important to do so. Under current usage, "fully mission capable" designations are bureaucratic type, button-counting designations which don't necessarily reflect whether a unit is in fact combat-ready. The only purpose for this amendment is to gain political advantage, trotting out the President's "awareness" that he is sending "unprepared troops" into combat. That's not what's going on.

Section 1902 prohibits deploying Army and Marine units for more than 365 days. While we'd all love to have our troops back home sooner, and with faster rotation times, this is war, and wars don't go according to pre-planned schedules. My cousin just had his deployment extended. As much as I want him back home with his wife and family, that should not come at the expense of the mission. At any rate, setting such precise deployment-period limits is "micromanaging." The next section, by the way, also requires each unit to have 365 days back home (210 for the Marines) before being redeployed.

Section 1904 (requiring the President to certify that the Iraqis were making progress in certain key areas) might be useful to push the Iraqis toward action if it weren't so transparently clear that the Democrats are hell-bent on getting us out of Iraq, no matter what. If the Democrats were actually saying "we're staying until we win, but we don't believe the Iraqi government has been serious enough, so here's some conditions," that might help. But that's not what most Democrats in Congress are saying. They're saying "we've lost," and similar defeatists whinings. Thus, the "conditions" being imposed are micro-managing, not actually helping.

Crucial unconstitutional language here:

And look at the wording of section 1904(c). If the President doesn't certify that the Iraqis have made progress as required in subsections (a) and (b):

the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq and complete such redeployment within 180 days.

Not "the Authorization for Use of Military Force shall be repealed 180 days thereafter," nor even "the authorization granted by the appropriations herein shall cease 180 days thereafter." No, the Secretary of Defense "shall commence the redeployment... That is actually ordering the movement of troops. Congress cannot order the movement of troops. Period. Yet this provision directly bypasses the Commander-in-Chief and gives a military order to the Secretary of Defense. It is absolutely unconstitutional.

There's more micromanaging in the bill, but those are some of the high points.