Reactions to Ledbetter

"Under federal law, it's illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of sex, so Lilly Ledbetter should have had a good claim against Goodyear Tire & Rubber," declares the Chicago Tribune, echoing the chorus of "me too" that has sprung up in the light of what struck me as a fairly easy case.

True enough. But the very same federal law sets certain conditions and procedures that must be followed. To pursue a Title VII claim, one must first have filed a complaint with EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1)(A). This is a procedural rule, a prerequisite that will foreclose a title VII suit if not followed, no matter how meritorious that suit may be. Presumably the Tribune would not argue to the contrary, but unless they are willing to do so, they must thereby concede that the broad purpose of Title VII is validly limited by its specific language. And if the broad remedial purpose is validly limited by one procedural requirement (filing with EEOC), I'm at a loss to see how they can distinguish another procedural requirement (the filing period, § 2000e–5(e)).

The Tribune doesn't deny that Title VII requires filing within a specified timeframe, and makes no effort to attack Ledbetter as a matter of law. Instead, it turns directly to policy-based arguments -- but even here, by its own terms, it is on infirm ground. The Tribune concedes that "[t]ime limits for civil rights cases make sense, so that companies don't have to defend themselves against charges that should have been raised long ago, instead of postponed until evidence has vanished and memories have faded." But to that assesment, they then bolt what strikes me as quite the opposite conclusion: even though they agree that companies shouldn't have to defend themselves against charges arising from events that are long-past, when "evidence has vanished and memories have faded," the Tribune thinks that Ledbetter's argument to the contrary was "eminently sensible." Lost in the din is the dispositive point: these are policy-based questions; judgment calls to be sure, but judgment calls that are Congress' to make. Congress made them. Last week, the court applied the statute. If Congress no longer agrees with the limitations earlier Congresses imposed, Congress can and should change them, but it should not do so under the duplicitous pretext that the court wrongly construed a statute by refusing to hollow it out, and instead giving it the most plausible reading.

HT: Howard.

Related:
Ledbetter v. Goodyear

Post facto:
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act stalls in the Senate (4/24/08)