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Libby and sentencing

Submitted by Simon on Thu, 06/07/2007 - 5:19pm

Orin Kerr takes on those calling for a reduced sentence for Scooter Libby, pointing out that many of those now calling for Libby to be pardoned have performed a volte face from the position on perjury and obstruction of justice they took during the Clinton impeachment. Adhering to my position of two years ago, I agree with Orin, although as Pat points out in the comments at Volokh, there are legitimate distinctions between the two cases.

Well, I'll be consistent. I

Well, I'll be consistent. I think both men deserved a slap on the wrist. I thought Clinton should be censured, and I think Libby should do community service and pay a nice fine.

Ditto.

"In the world you will find tribulation, but be of good cheer, for I have overcome the world."

John 16:33

That Volokh thread...

That Volokh thread sure degenerated, huh Simon?

I read a decent amount of

I read a decent amount of the Volokh comments, and I have to say I'm completely stumped as to what the pro-Libby argument is. I pride myself on usually being able to understand both sides of an argument, but I really can't here.

Unless you believe that Fitzgerald is rogue prosecutor and a liar, that the CIA is out to get Cheyney, and that the sentencing judge is out to get Libby, the facts clearly show that (i) Fitzgerald had a reasonable grounds believe that a crime may have been committed and (ii) Libby lied to a grand jury in an attempt to impede the investigation into the crime. Libby tried to mitigate the sentence by showing no crime was committed, and that tactic backfired--Fitzgerald did what any good prosecutor should do in that case and tried to demonstrate that a crime may have been committed. Maybe 30 months is too long, but it seems within the range of the guidelines on a quick read.

What am I missing? Seriously, I respect Pat and Tully (even though they are wrong alot ;-)), but I can't see any merit in the argument.

Pat seems to be saying that Fitzgerald knew no crime was committed but kept investigating anyway, which stongly implies that he was just out to get someone (ie, a rogue prosecutor), and Tully seems to be saying that Fitzgerald is lying about the information he got from the CIA about Plame traveling overseas. Is that the argument?

Volokh was quickly degenerating, so I thought that I may get a better response here.

That's not quite what I'm saying, Justin...

First, thanks for the compliment in coming here to avoid the flamewars... ;-)

I haven't said that Fitzgerald knew there was no crime committed before investigating. I'm saying I have a substantial question as to whether leaking Plame's name would in fact be a violation of the IIPA, and I see no evidence in the record that Fitzgerald actually examined that issue closely before embarking on his quest to find who leaked the name. And not to speak for Tully, but I don't understand him to be accusing Fitzgerald of lying about anything. Both of these are closely related points.

For a CIA employee's identity to be protected from disclosure under the IIPA, they must meet 2 criteria. First, they must be a classified employee. Plame undoubtedly meets that criteria. Second, they must have "served overseas" in the 5 years preceding the leak. Let's call a person meeting both of these criteria "IIPA covert."

The problem comes in because the CIA does not actually use this particular categorization scheme in its day-to-day work. It does not mark someone's personnel jacket as being "IIPA covert" or not. Instead, the CIA just considers whether someone is classified or not. The confusion arises because the CIA refers to all of its classified employees with the word "covert," whether they've ever served overseas or not. Thus, whenever someone at CIA says, in the regular course of business, that someone is "covert," they just mean "classified." Use of that word says nothing about whether the person is IIPA covert. Let's call this conventional use of the term "CIA covert."

If you wish to establish that leaking Plame's name would violate the IIPA, you must establish not that she is "CIA covert" but that she is "IIPA covert." If you simply ask the CIA, "is Valerie Plame covert," they would tell you yes, even if she had never once traveled overseas, so long as she was a classified employee. From all the evidence I've seen, Fitzgerald never asked the CIA "is Valerie Plame a classified employee, AND has she served overseas in the 5 years before Scooter Libby's first leak of her name?".

Even in the most recent employment summary document from the CIA, the CIA never said that she "served" overseas in the preceding 5 years. It said she traveled overseas without official cover, which may or may not mean anything (and they're fuzzy on the time frame, too, if I recall correctly).

What Tom Maguire, Tully, I, and many others have stated is that the CIA is required by law to pay an extra stipend to people during their service overseas. Thus, Plame's pay records should show whether she had gotten the overseas service payment at any point during the preceding 5 years. It's not a difficult thing to determine at all. Just go look at their pay records for Ms. Plame.

If the CIA were to provide an affidavit that they had reviewed Plame's personnel records and found that she had been paid for overseas service after 1998 (about), that would absolutely settle the matter. With such an affidavit, I would join the chorus stating that Libby should indeed be sentenced based on obstructing an investigation into that crime. But if the CIA is unable to provide such an affidavit, then that means that Plame was NOT "IIPA covert," and thus leaking her name was not a violation of the IIPA. Because Fitzgerald could have, and should have, made that determination first, before proceeding with looking at who leaked the name, it would be inappropriate to change him with impairing an investigation into a crime which could not have, by definition, occurred.

Yep. A prima facie showing

If the CIA were to provide an affidavit that they had reviewed Plame's personnel records and found that she had been paid for overseas service after 1998 (about), that would absolutely settle the matter.

Yep. A prima facie showing of violation potential could have easily been made with the pay records if they showed pay for overseas service in the relevant time frame. I suspect they do not. I suspect the counter-contention by Fitz's office would be that while no overseas service was credited in the relevant time frame, Plame had travelled TDY overseas in the relevant time frame using her old cover passport. That gray area provides wiggle room for Fitz.

And it would explain why he sought to keep such evidence out. "Reasonable doubt" on the one issue could have swayed the jury. But then he alleged it without any presentation of actual evidence, only his own (very vaguely worded to avoid simple analysis) assertion that she was covered under IIPA. THAT'S what I wanna throw the flag on.

Nope, I'm saying that

Nope, I'm saying that unevidenced allegations and assertions from a prosecutor shouldn't be considered as established facts in considering sentencing enhancements. Especially when the prosecutor actively prevented the acquisition and presentation by the defense of the evidence that could have established the facts of the point.

Note: If not for the defense's frustrated attempts to obtain such evidence for trial, I wouldn't think Libby should be allowed to use such claims either. There has been NO substantive evidence presented one way or another of Plame's actual status under IIPA. So, to me, both Libby's allegation that there was no underlying crime made as a sentence mitigator, and Fitzgerald's unevidenced assertion in rejoinder that Plame was "covert" under IIPA made as a sentence enhancer, using ONLY Fitzgerald's own summary of a CIA summary that itself appears to have been insufficient to establish that, are nullities that the court should ignore. The ONLY consideration I can see there is a subjective one on the part of the judge, who sided with Fitz in barring obtaining said evidence for defense use at trial.

Fitzgerald's assertion that he was actually actively pursuing investigation of possible IIPA and EA violations is another issue, one well-evidenced in the record, and supports that part of his motion for sentence enhancement. The separate "pro-Libby" argument there is that Fitz knew (or should have known) at the time Libby was questioned, that there was no violation, and the investigation should have ended at the point Fitz knew there was no violation, is a side issue. I'd call it nit-picking, in light of the verdict, difficult to prove, but somewhat valid as a counter-argument if true. However I doubt it could ever be shown by the defense, and thereby dismiss the argument as speculative.

I would add, by the way...

What Tully said. I would also add that I'm rather disappointed in the judge's comment that Libby's lawyer should have re-asked for the personnel data during the sentencing phase. The judge should be able to see from the data in the record that whether there was or was not an IIPA violation was a substantial issue at sentencing and demanded the information for himself.

His job, after all, is to dispense justice, not simply split the difference between the lawyers on each side. He seems to have believed that whether Plame was IIPA covert might make a difference, or else he wouldn't have fussed at Libby's lawyers for not asking for it again. And if he thinks it's relevant to his sentencing, and it's information that is relatively easy to obtain, then he had, I think, an obligation to ask for it himself.

Pat, you were a prosecutor,

Pat, you were a prosecutor, right? Would a sentencing judge ever suggest that a defendant's sophisticated legal counsel ask for certain evidence? I would be suprised if that were the case, but I defer to your experience.

In any event, I have trouble believing that Libby's lawyers simply didn't think of re-asking for the documents at the sentencing phase--if they did, it is pretty blatant legal malpractice, as the underlying crime was an issue at sentencing, but not during the trial, so those documents would be relevant at sentencing (a first year law student could figure that out). So, either his high-priced legal team is incompetent, of they didn't ask for the documents because the lawyers were not in fact sure that the docs would help Libby. Sure, they could have bet that Fitzgerald was bluffing with regards to whether Plame travelled overseas in an official capacity over the past five years etc., but that would seem like a monumentally stupid thing to do.

It depends, Justin...

Judges vary widely in their temperament and willingness to do some work themselves rather than rely on the lawyers to do everything. I certainly have experienced judges suggesting certain lines of approach to lawyers when the judges considered it to be in the interest of justice. Once, a defense lawyer, very well-respected, highly competent, was actually losing ground in a DWI case I was prosecuting. Every witness she called wound up helping my case, turning a loser of a case into one it looked like I was going to win. At some point, the judge (who also had somewhere else she wanted to be) called us up to the bench, and let the attorney know, very clearly, that if she rested right this second, the result would be a not guilty verdict, whereas if she continued, the way things were going, the verdict might change.

So yes, it happens. Good judges do not merely play referee, they try to do justice, even where the lawyers fall short. The judge is to act only on evidence, not mere allegations by a lawyer. Moreover, the defense has no burden to prove anything. It is the prosecutor's burden to prove everything relevant to his case. It is improper for a judge to say "well, the prosecutor alleged X, and the defendant didn't offer any evidence against X, so I'll believe X. The prosecutor must provide evidence of X before the judge may accept it. In this way, among others, criminal trials differ from civil ones.

As for why Libby's lawyers did not ask again, I don't know. I'd have to examine the original rulings. Recall that the records are classified, and therefore special relevance must be shown before they would be admitted into the record. The judge's original order may have been broadly phrased so as to suggest that he would not order any of the personnel records declassified. But it's got nothing to do with calling bluffs. The judge obviously acted as if the matter had been proven without the documents; the documents thus could only have helped Libby. If they proved Plame served overseas, then they'd be no worse off than they were before. If they proved otherwise, they'd be much better off.

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