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Whatever
"Don't Ask Don't Tell" (i.e. 10 U.S.C. § 654) returns to the stage in a story that implies the military has changed its mind. See also this. For my part, I have made my Somervellian position on this issue pellucidly clear, most recently in this post last year:
I believe that we should give a great deal of deference to the professionals in a given field—the people who are hands-on, the people on the front lines. ... For a fairly extreme example, an issue on which I find it appropriate that my position is [unqualified] deference to the professionals, my position on "Don't Ask Don't Tell" is essentially "whatever the military wants." If the military want it, § 654 should stay; if they want it gone, it should be repealed. I have no idea if gays serving openly in the military is good, bad, or indifferent to the ability of the military to conduct operations. Congress certainly doesn't. And if you aren't presently serving on active duty in the United States military, neither do you. The best judges of what hurts the operational readiness of the United States military and what helps it—the sole criterion where this issue is concerned—is the United States military themselves. Their word should be decisive.
... [T]hat's an extreme if not unique example [of my willingness to defer]…. I counsel deference[] in the proportion dictated by specific context, not abdication of judgment. The military is an exceptional context, given their mission and the imminent risk to their lives and limbs; it accordingly gets exceptionally high deference.
If the military concludes ("conclude" implying more than a mere whim or fleeting fashion) that it is no longer troubled by gays serving, section 654 should be repealed. Congressional interference (a fortiori when motivated by nothing more than pallid political correctness) is at its least defensible when lives are on the line.
Finally, in regard to the statement that the President "faced the fact that if he did not change the policy, his administration would be forced to defend publicly the constitutionality of a law he had long opposed," as I noted in this post, one must treat with skepticism the claim that the President opposes DADT:
Once we understand that DADT is not merely authorized but enacted by statute, we understand that it can't be "eliminated" without the repeal of § 654. That is ineluctably a job for Congress. And Obama isn't running for Congress - he's running away from it. If given the job he's asking for, he will have less power to repeal § 654 than he does today. As President, he can only "recommend to [Congress'] consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient"; as a member of the Senate he could write and introduce such legislation. That also begs the question: if President Obama would be in favor of eliminating DADT, why hasn't Senator Obama introduced any bills repealing § 654?
(Emphasis and citation deleted.) Indeed, the depth of his commitment is hinted at by the shallowness of his analysis, as reported in the Times' story: "Obama told [the] Defense Secretary … [and] chairman of the joint chiefs of staff[] that the law was 'just wrong.'"
Post facto:
The Murphy Amendment (5/28/2010)
An opportunity in disguise (11/8/2010)
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did the military want "don't ask don't tell?"
How did the "pros" feel then? And did it end up bringing down the ship?
I agree wholeheartedly that professions deserve some measure of deference due to their domain-specific insight. No dispute there. The question is "how much deference?"
I perceive this as a civil rights issue, though others clearly don't. IMO, to ask folks to deny their identity requires a better reason than deference. That would bring the debate to the issue of what the expected actual consequences of changing the policy would be, for example, on the battlefield.
Deference would dictate, in your view, that only soldiers can know and understand. I am happy to acknowledge that they'd know far better than I. But this does not make me wholly ignorant. I am reluctant to perpetuate bigotry in the name of battlefield cohesion and related concepts.
I am confident that these changes will come, and most will accept them pretty quickly, and that over time it'll prove to be no issue. Perhaps this policy change should be a accompanied by some policy that allows soldiers who think they can't handle soldiering with homosexuals to opt for a general discharge. Surely such soldiers would be proud to make such an official declaration, if they in fact feel so strongly about ti?
I disagree, a bit...
Yes, we need to listen to the professionals, but at the same time, the professional military is ultimately subject to civilian control, and there's a reason for that. Integrating gays into the military will bring some issues, no doubt.
The reasons given by supporters of the ban on gay servicemen are largely based on speculation and assumptions. My own contacts at the grunt level tell me that there are any number of gay men in their squads and so forth who don't cause any problems at all, even though their orientation is largely known (if not asked or told). Other squads no doubt have had problems, some due to no doubt to obnoxiousness by the gay servicemen in question, others by the intolerance of a few straight soldiers.
In the end, while I think there are some significant differences between racial discrimination and discrimination based on sexual orientation, I think the reasons given to justify excluding gays from serving in the armed forces are based on little more than prejudice. I'm quite confident that our military can, as it did with racial integration, learn to deal with troublemakers, be they gay or straight, in the ranks. If some straight soldier is uncomfortable with having a gay man in his barracks, just because he's gay, then that's a problem the straight soldier has, and he needs to grow up and deal with it... and the Army should tell him so.
It's past time for the repeal of this policy. We're at war, and we need every willing fighter we can get to serve. The Army has plenty of mechanisms to weed out any flamboyant, aggressively propositioning gay men (an undoubtedly offensive stereotype) who start prancing around in wigs and "gaying it up." It also has mechanisms that can be used to weed out soldiers who are bigoted against homosexuals, who bully them just for their sexuality rather than anything they've actually done to the other soldiers.
I say it's time to repeal this policy and allow homosexuals to openly serve in the Armed Forces.
In other words...
In other words, sometimes the Army brass is primarily worried about what makes their lives easier or harder, rather than what is ultimately best for the country or even the armed forces themselves. The top military brass can also become insular thinking, blinded by parochialism of a sort, or trapped in a history of "we've always done it that way," or the results of past bureaucratic in-fighting. That's when it is appropriate for the civilian command structure to step in and force changes, regardless of what the generals want on any given day.
Indeed. The argument against ending the policy that keeps
coming up seems to boil down to some fear that if gay soldiers are allowed to coexist openly with straight soldiers, then there will be increased sexual tension, and the like. Frankly, that argument reeks of irrational fear. Our soldiers are trained professionals, and I fail to see why if the UCMJ has uniform rules for public displays of sexual behavior, why it should matter at all. The problem is that gay soldiers are forced to hide their identity, because if it comes out that the soldier is gay or lesbian, the soldier is forced out, regardless of their abilities on the battlefield.
We all have our personal views on homsexuality, but it doesn't matter, when the defense of the nation is at stake. If we have standards of conduct, it shouldn't matter what one's sexual orientation is, thus removing the need to keep it hidden, or have it affect one's performance on the battlefield.
With all due respect...
I suppose that my starting point is that I just don't care whether it's rational or not. If it manifests itself in combat, to the detriment of the unit's ability to deal with combat, what matters is the fact of it, not whether it was rational or not. I care about our troops' safety being diminished in the name of some abstract political theory that we can discuss from the safety of a couch and a laptop. I'm not willng to ask one American soldier to be injured or killed in order to make me feel more fuzzy and inclusive.
This post isn't a front (as McCain's similar claim might be): I mean it when I say that my opinion on the merits of the issue (if I had one) should be discounted because I'm not a member of the military. I lack the expertise or experience to know what will actually help or hurt the military, and I have no skin in the game, so my incentives are inaptly ordered. Whether my view is more or less "rational" than that of the people in harm's way is, in my view, wholly irrelevant. I'm hardly a populist, but at risk of evoking their language, it strikes me as the worst kind of ivory tower detachment to say: "you who are risking your life for me, are stupid and irrational; here is how I would prefer you to risk your life for me."
Of course, no one will disagree with Pat that the military is subject to civilian direction; that is proper. I don't even take what I think was General Somervell's position that the civilian leadership should tell the military what to do and leave entirely to their discretion how it is done. But if the rule of clear mistake has any vitality at all, it is in this context. Civilian interference with clearly, peculiarly , and interal military matters—a fortiori over the express disagreement of the military itself—requires not only clear and compelling reasons, but reasons of overriding importance. Even the very best argument against DADT—the perceived need for more experts in X—does not rise to that level absent military concurrence.
It is the military that has the expertise and experience, and the right incentive structure, to be institutionally competent to make this decision. Accordingly, if the military decides it is for it, the shoe will be on the other foot. Then, one can predict that certain leaders on the right who need not be named will go ballistic. Their abstract opinion in favor of keeping gays out is every bit as irrelevant in the face of a contrary view in the military as anyone's abstract view in favor of it. If the military concludes that it wants to accept (or is no balance better served by accepting) openly gay servicemembers, that is in my view the end of the argument and Congress should repeal DADT. Whichever way the review comes out, the members of Congress who vote against the military's position should be mocked and belittled for putting their personal opinions for or against gays over and above the safety of our troops.
I can agree with that, but my question is whether you agree with it. Because the implication of that argument is that if it really doesn't matter—if it's unimportant compared to the overriding priority of the nation—then it shouldn't be imposed over the contrary views (if they are indeed contrary) of the military, no? Or do people's "personal views" only not matter when those personal views are servicemembers who are uncomfortable? I say that your personal views and mine don't matter. That's the point.
so then was
So then de-segregating the army in 1948 was a mistake?
INTEGRATION
OF THE ARMED FORCES
1940-1965
Or was it Ok only because it was done in 1948, after WWII? And were the voices of civil rights leaders irrelevant, in your view?
I wondered who'd fire that
I wondered who'd fire that shot. ;) I don't know the answer to that and don't have time to read the link you posted fully, but one thing that jumps out from a quick skim is that integration had the support of some very prominent members of the military hierarchy. Whether (in this case) Marshall is like Mullen, and to what extent they represent(ed) the mainstream of thought in the military, remains to be seen. As you say, it was also done outside of wartime, and that might also affect the calculus.
of course
Well of course, because it's worth asking. I'm quite willing to admit that aroundabout 12/8/1941, the C-in-C would have been negligent if he had blithely ordered intregration then despite widespread resistance.
So again, the question is "how much deference?" And mileage will vary not just by person, but by circumstances.
It's worth noting that the military and sports have sometimes been in the public vanguard when we've looked at expanding civil rights. When teams of people are working towards a shared goal and have sacrificed and toiled for its sake, that has a way of clearing the mind about what matters most and what is secondary.
Here's where I disagree...
You say: "It is the military that has the expertise and experience, and the right incentive structure, to be institutionally competent to make this decision."
The military will be looking only at its own very limited, task-specific goals, not the larger issue of what's right, what's best for the country, or even what's best for the Army in the long term. In the short term, there would certainly be some growing pains associated with the policy change, as there were growing pains when admitting women into the Army. But many of those growing pains (not all, but a lot) will be due to negative reactions by bigoted soldiers and officers who are simply prejudiced against homosexuals (most in the Army would have no problem with it, I believe, but there's certainly a subset who would). So the military's short term interest is not to have to deal with those growing pains. But the chunk of growing pains which are based on the bigotry of some soldiers are just not things we should allow to inhibit us from doing the right thing; there shouldn't be a "bigots veto."
Moreover, the Constitution does not vest such decisions in the military. Congress should certainly listen to any concerns they have in crafting the policy, but the decision properly belongs to Congress, and it should not purely defer to the military on the subject, just as it was appropriate for the civilian leadership of President Bush to ignore the many generals who thought the surge, and counter-insurgency as a whole, was a bad idea, and go with the ones which, in his opinion, were right.
If somebody could convince me that allowing gays to serve in the military would truly undermine, immediately, our ability to fight wars effectively, then I would probably say, ok, do what we have to do. But I simply don't believe that. If some officers in the military believe that it would, fine, let them make that case... but they don't get to be the judge deciding the outcome. They need to persuade Congress, and the American people, that they are correct.
The military will be looking
Well, exactly. ;) The argument about it being in their longer-term interests seems sound, but I don't know that my idea of what is in the long-term interests of the military should be—is sufficiently compelling to be—imposed over their own idea of their long-term interests, as if they were an errant child having their electives selected by their parents "for their own good." I would expect those arguments to be carefully weighed by the military leadership (and to be clearly, I mean the uniformed leadership, not civilian) in formulating their conclusion.
I understand that the Constitution ultimately vests this decision in Congress, as it also vests many operational decisions with the President. I am not suggesting that their authority is anything short of plenary. My position is that in exercising their legitimate authority over the military, the political branches should be extremely hesitant to displace the military's own judgment. (Of course, that position presupposes that there is a judgment made that can be attributed to the military, corporately; where the military are themselves divided on the question, as in the example you mention, there is more leeway.)
Let's dig deeper...
Simon, I don't think we should be giving the military even Chevron-style deference on significant social policy issues of this sort. That is most properly the job of the civilian leadership.
Let's suppose a couple of hypotheticals to explore further. Assume, arguendo, that the top brass of the military is afflicted with the same sort of personal-level bigotry which, some assert, afflicts the lower ranks, the sort of bigotry which would cause the soldiers in the foxholes and the barracks to fear that every gay man is about to hit on them. Would it be appropriate to defer to their opinion, if we were to know for certain that most of them had a personal bigotry against homosexuals? Of course not.
Your argument also seems to presuppose that the military currently has a fairly uniform anti-homosexual policy belief. I don't know that that's the case. Moreover, determining what the military's opinion on that subject is is rather difficult. If the commander-in-chief makes known his desire to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military, wouldn't you expect at least a few 3-star generals to publicly support him, in hopes of winning that 4th star? Wouldn't you expect that at least a few politically conservative generals would oppose him primarily in hopes of getting the 4th star from some future conservative president? And the military has its own internal politics which would come into play. If your commanding officer is known to be anti-gay-in-the-military, are you going to speak up, even in internal debates, on such a sensitive topic? Of course not. The military is not institutionally equipped to make these kind of social policy decisions.
It's not that the military is an "errant child," it's that it has its own institutional small-c conservatism, it's own predilections and resistance to change, it's own institutional misjudgments which cloud its future thinking. Prior to the promotion of General Petraeus, for example, the Army was, on the whole, institutionally hostile to the idea of counter-insurgency. It had just enough political support that it kept alive, got a very few officer promoted to the lower circles of the top brass, but most ambitious officers knew that counterinsurgency was NOT the ticket to the top. It took 4 years or more Rumsfeld pushing out the "we want more and more tanks and big artillery pieces" generals and President Bush listening to and pulling up Petraeus by personal presidential decision to push the Army to actually seriously invest in counterinsurgency thinking. Had President Bush had the level of deference to the military that you prescribe... and that was on a matter of military tactics and strategy with no social policy overtones at all... then that never would have happened.
So sure, listen to them. See if their arguments are consistent and rational, or if they are based on prejudice, assumptions, and a fear that the American soldier will prove to be too intolerant to obey orders and continue to fight for his country regardless of the sexual orientation of the next guy over in the foxhole. If they can make a good case for continuing the discrimination, fine. If they can show that the examples of promiscuous gays making trouble in the ranks are more prevalent than the examples of gay men serving quietly and with dignity, fine. I don't think they can show that, though. And if they can't, if they can't persuade the civilian leadership (which is, ultimately, we the people), then it's entirely appropriate for the civilian leadership to give them their orders.
without diminishing Bush's role
I don't know the facts of Bush's or Rumsfeld's efforts here. So let me just note that my following comments are not intended to challenge your assertion or diminish whatever role Bush and Rumsfeld played.
As a student of critical and creative thinking, I have an abiding interest in problem-solving and decision making. Over time, certain themes and storylines re-appear. As you say or imply, small c conservatism in institutions manifests as a clingy faith in past practices and suspicion of new ideas. For a variety of reasons.
As Schopenauer once noticed, new truth passes through three stages. In the first it is ridiculed. Then it is vehemently opposed. And then it is routinely accepted. When it comes to counterinsurgency, credit for the shift must go not just to Bush and Rumsfeld but to the IMO overwhelming force of truth about what sorts of tactics could effectively combat the clever and well-evolved insurgent tactics of 4th generation warfare. The peacetime obsession with big toys was a narrow, backward-looking vision. And circumstances tutored the truly vigilant minds.
Institutions don't like to evolve. In fact, you could say they hate it. The older the institution, the more tradition. And of course, the more stability. But healthy institutions must evolve, and they often need to do so via unpopular or controversial pushes from leaders.
I think America is well on its way to deciding that homosexuality is just another wholly acceptable human variation. And the military will help more of us figure this out.
The COIN Revolution...
... was actually more like that scene in War and Peace, when the Tsar explicitly states that he does not want Kutuzov promoted to General-in-Chief, only for Tolstoy to describe a series of events in the very same paragraph that culminates with the Tsar appointing Kutuzov General-in-Chief of the Russian Army a few days later. That is to say, neither Rumsfeld nor his critics wanted it, but a series of events led to the rise of David Petraeus and his camp's rapid consolidation of power in Iraq.
The debate between Rumsfeld and his critics was never about conventional versus unconventional (read: counterinsurgency) warfare tactics-- on the contrary, both sides were actually arguing different methods of fighting a conventional war, and the debate had started long before Iraq and Afghanistan (the "Millennium Challenge Exercise" and debate over the formation of the Stryker Brigades being early examples). The critics (which would have included Generals Shinseki, Zinni, and Odom) essentially argued that the Coalition needed more troops on the ground, including artillery and a large logistical tail, in order to accomplish their strategic objectives, while Rumsfeld's camp argued that advances in technology enabled the US Army to "do more with less" leveraging US Air Force precision guided munitions that destroyed targets more accurately and improved C4ISR platforms that led to enhanced battlespace awareness, among other things. But neither side was actually talking about a need to fight a different kind of war-- i.e., employing an integrated civ-mil strategy that executed intelligence-driven action derived from a supportive local population which we protected. Those voices, which included Petraeus, John Nagl, Andy Krepinevich, and Dave Kilcullen, largely stayed out of the Rumsfeld Versus The General Critics Debate, and only came to power because Petraeus became the basket in which President Bush put all his eggs when he decided to throw his Hail Mary.
Mind you, Rumsfeld was right about some things-- he repudiated the PowellDoctrine by implementing the "Thunder Run," overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime and defeating his military with just four Army brigades and one Marine Expeditionary Division, and that was something that conventional Army officers couldn't believe was possible. But he wasn't pushing a counterinsurgency strategy, and once the war transitioned to an asymmetric fight from its initial conventional linear origin, Rumsfeld's model was no longer useful, regardless of how many troops he had on the ground (the same would have been true of his critics, of course). But in my opinion, there's little reason to believe that Rumsfeld would have empowered the COIN Revolution if he had remained on as SECDEF, as he had ample opportunity to elevate it during his tenure and never did. In the end, it was something that "just plain happened."
--Bobby
Thanks a bunch for the succinct history recap
Thanks a bunch for the succinct history recap. You always have something useful to say when you find time to drop by, Bobby.
As far as "just plain happened" goes, would you also say that it happened at least in part because Petraeus and like-minded had taken the time and effort to develop a viable alternative approach? More than random chance, IOW.
Yeah
I think it's fair to say that General Petraeus and his camp shaped their destiny to some extent, especially with their considerable efforts to push their doctrine to the forefront in the various military journals. For that, however, President Bush does also deserve some credit for, while it is now viewed as somewhat inevitable that Petraeus would succeed Casey as Commander of Multinational Forces - Iraq, it wasn't necessarily a foregone conclusion at the time, and President Bush could have leaned on any one of a number of other candidates for the position -- Pete Chiarelli, Dan McNeill, David McKiernan, and John Vines would have been the leading competitors, none of whom were classic COIN proponents (although Chiarelli would certainly not be considered in the conventional warfare camp).
All things considered, it could have unfolded in a completely different manner.
--Bobby
good to know
Good to know what roles various folks played. I agree that Bush deserves credit for his choice.
His critics would be likely to pipe up that any credit for that choice should be overshadowed by earlier poor choices. But I have a hard time thinking of any President who would have ignored the advice of whatever council of entrenched experts was available to him in the given context. That context being his first year of office, at a time of great perceived national peril.
I've personally been critical of Bush for seeming to be, briefly, insufficiently studious of and curious about important details related to important and complex matters. His choice of Petraeus is certainly one strong data point suggesting that whatever processes he used helped him to separate wheat from chaff and find the person with the most fully-formed alternative approach (in the face of the obvious insufficiency of the existing one.)
There are a lot of really tough (I'd say unrealistic) graders out there who expect other folks to always get things right on the first try, While it's great when folks are able to do this, my personal experience is that it happens infrequently enough that we should consider valuing more highly the ability to re-assess and adapt. Many military folks seem to be among the minority that really truly gets that. Probably because they are called upon to operate in the highest stakes environments.
I wish more folks appreciated the importance of this as an aspect of creative intelligence. Most people think creativity only relates to art. But it relates VERY strongly to problem solving. Solutions are very often created via a good faith feedback loop. Such a feedback loop can't work until you get to the crucial "this isn't working what else do we have" part.
Simon, what I meant by irrational fear, wasn't that our soldiers
in the field have this fear, but the argument that opponents of the DADT repeal are making that this would cause disruption. How much verified evidence of this do we have? Have soldiers been polled? I understand that having not actually served in the military, I lack the expertise that others (such as Sen. McCain) would have, been as in the case of war policy, I don't think my opinion (or yours) should be discounted because of that. Keep in mind that a lot of the support for the repeal comes from current and ex-military, so it's hardly an example of detached, ivory-tower elitism, when actual soldiers are losing their jobs.
Oh, and we're all Americans, Simon. I think we all have skin in the game.
For what it's worth
If DADT is overturned, I think the military will adjust, adapt and continue with their mission to fight and win the nation's wars. Enough other countries (including the UK and Canada) have successfully integrated openly homosexual soldiers into their military that I think we're not going to see the institution collapse. Then, too, many of the issues that would emerge have already become somewhat moot as we've implemented more closely integrated interagency partners and contractors into the battle, many of whom have no such DADT rules of their own.
That said, I think we're being naive if we think there won't be some negative consequences in terms of reduced unit cohesion and increased chain of command incidents in at least some units, most likely my old stomping ground the infantry (which I can say precisely because I spent so many years with the ground pounders and am well-versed in their culture and mindsets). We've already seen issues arise with the closer integration of female Soldiers into combat arms units (which was prohibited during the Clinton Administration and is still prohibited today, even as the Army has developed policies that allow them to work around those rules -- note that this would have become necessary in the current conflicts, even if it wasn't a net positive, which I think it is) or on the Navy submarines. That's not to say DADT should or should not be repealed, but pretending that it will have no negative consequences of any kind is foolish, and many of the advocates for overturning DADT have never served in the infantry and don't really understand its culture.
From a military effectiveness standpoint, if overturning DADT leads to a decline in recruiting/retention from some camps (i.e., homophobes, conservatives, etc.) that is not off-set by increased recruiting/retention from other camps, then what we're talking about is reducing our troop strength at a time when we can ill afford it (alternatively, we can argue that more "progressive-minded" troops would implicitly lead to improved military effectiveness, but I don't think that thesis would carry much water). So, at the end of the day, if the Administration thinks overturning DADT will have no net effect on the force, then overturning DADT is a non-issue and should happen. Likewise, if they think fairness and justice trump military effectiveness, then overturning DADT likewise needs to happen, albeit accepting the impact it's going to have on the force.
Personally, I suspect it won't matter much-- I'm guessing that most Soldiers are already aware of who in their midst is gay, and while they might harbor some ill will, it isn't likely to be any greater than they feel toward, say, the Wiccans. And I'm guessing that few homosexuals will be enlisting in units where their sexuality will be much of an issue. Finally, the military is a professional institution and will follow orders at the end of the day, so if they're told they can't tolerate discrimination against gays, then they're going to take affirmative action to ensure that happens. But mark my words, they may not outweigh the positives that the policy change produces, but there will be some ugly incidents somewhere down the road.
--Bobby
All good points, Bobby.
Agreed.
indeed
Indeed. IMO, there's nothing worse than being blithe about such a change, as though perceived moral concerns about civil rights were the only issue. Or even the foremost one. Under some circumstances, I can accept that it shouldn't be foremost.
And I think it's really astute of you to point at the cultural issue. I've never served and so am pretty ignorant of the infantry's subculture. In the past I worked long enough in blue color retail to understand the self-sustaining power that a well-developed subculture can have over perception. Or in English, I think I understand the idea even if I don't understand the specific culture of infantry.
Some number of ugly incidents are IMO a given, as you say.
Military Times just released
Military Times just released a survey of 3000 active duty troops on whether DADT should be overturned. 51% opposed overturning DADT (which is actually down from a 2004 survey which pegged it at 65%), 30% favor overturning DADT (which is up from a 2003 survey indicating 23%), and 18% declined to state. One can see the military is trending toward being more inclusive of homosexuals in the service, but we're still talking about 51% being opposed to overturning the policy (36.8% "strongly opposed"). I would also note that the Military Times survey crossed all services-- I suspect there's probably significant differences between the services and, even within each service, the branches.
Other intreseting tidbits from the survey... It indicated 95% of service members as straight, 1.3% gay, 0.8% bisexual, 0.1% not sure, 2.8% decline to answer, and 0.1% other... When asked if they thought a member of their (approxmately 100-troop) unit was gay, 57.4% responded yes, 16.5% no, 25.5% unsure, and 0.6% declined to answer... When asked if, to their knowledge, did their chain of command ever find out a service member was gay but decline to take action, 11.3% responded yes, 48.8% no, 33.4% unsure, 4.9% not applicable, and 1.6% declined to answer.
Of course, the military doesn't get a vote on whether or not to follow federal law or lawful orders from the Commander-in-Chief (well, save perhaps the 11.3% who apparently have been deciding not to follow DADT!). And they don't get to decide whether they get to serve with openly gay troops any more than Catholics or blacks or immigrants. They will do what they are told to do, and when someone violates policy, they will be punished. But 51% is a relatively large number. I think it's kind of naive to think they will suddenly engender good will simply because the law changes and I think there are going to be some transition problems. The Administration may also find themselves in a recruiting/retention bind if a significant portion of that 36.8% decide to "vote with their feet," so to speak.
But at the end of the day, I think overturning DADT must be accompanied by an assurance that heterosexuals will be able to serve openly in the Navy. (h/t to The Onion)
--Bobby
Transition problems to be sure...
lol on the Navy joke...
I certainly agree that there can't help but be transition problems. And perhaps the risk that the problems will be wide-spread enough to cause enough disruption to impact our current engagements is sufficiently great that we need to delay for a time. But we could easily enough change the policy with a post-dated effective date.
Moreover, there could be, as there have been with women, a staggered implementation. Move forward with, say, the Air Force first. Or do it service-wide, but not in combat units. Or move forward immediately only with those serving as experts in fields where there is a short supply of experts, such as translators. (Or maybe only in units stationed in England... thank you, don't forget to tip your waiter).
And thanks, Bobby, for the clarification re: counterinsurgency. I didn't mean to give Rumsfeld credit for promoting it in any way. But I think the fact that he engaged the "big tank battle" generals and fought them on behalf of the "small nimble" generals cleared some of the ground to allow for Petraeus to be noticed and make himself be heard.