The New Way Forward in Iraq: A look at the President's plan

As I said yesterday, my first opinion of the President's plan is quite positive and cautiously optimistic. Today I want to look a bit more in-depth at the plan, its sources, and the key assumptions the Administration has made in preparing it.

The President's Plan, the Baker Group Report, and the "Surge"

Despite significant criticism by pundits across the spectrum, President Bush has largely adopted the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group Report (the ISG/Baker report)... including the very name. The ISG report [pdf], titles its recommendations: "The Way Forward -- A New Approach", which the White House has simplified to "The New Way Forward". Much of the early analysis of the ISG report was focused on its calls for diplomatic engagement of Iran and Syria, but it also called for a surge of troops:

While this process [increasing the size and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces] is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. We should continue to maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units.

The President's plan is right in line with this recommendation, as it calls for greater deployment of both U.S. and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and Anbar, where the security problems are the greatest. The U.S. will put in 20,000 new troops into Baghdad, with about one battalion in each of 9 districts there. The Iraqis will put even more troops in, with a full brigade in each of the 9 districts to be backed up by the American battalions.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The ISG report also noted the potential successes by, and the problems facing, the Provincial Reconstruction teams:

The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a positive effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their work is hampered by significant security constraints.

The White House has clearly listened to some folks on the ground about practical ways of enhancing the efforts of the PRTs. From the White House fact sheet:

• Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone.
• Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone.
• Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

I'm very pleased to read that, and not just because my co-blogger Bobby is heading up one of the PRTs. The PRTs are designed to be multi-agency, boots-on-the-ground guys out in the field interacting with locals, providing security, infrastructure repair, political training for local officials, and other needed services and training. You can (and SHOULD) read Bobby's thoughts from last November on "The Way Ahead". The Bush plan's practical support for the PRTs suggests to me that he is getting, and heeding, some good advice from people on the ground.

As I mentioned in my post yesterday, the most important thing about the "surge" is not the numbers but the rules of engagement. Previously, we were constrained in going after at least some militias (especially al-Sadr's), because Prime Minister Maliki wouldn't let us, and even ordered us to remove a roadblock we had set up to control those militias. The President assures us that we will no longer play (or allow the Iraqi government to play) favorites with the militias. From the President's Fact Sheet:

• Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference.
• Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
• Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.

Political and Diplomatic Components of the Plan

Much of the blog discussion is on the "surge" part of the plan. But the President's new plan is larger than that. Like the ISG Report, it addresses economic, political, and regional issues as well. These plans are less defined, and may be based on more hope than will turn out to be justified, but they take the appropriate tack. I suspect that there are some secret diplomatic messages going out to Iran and Syria even as the President was announcing the movement of another carrier air group to the area. I've always been a fan of the carrot and stick approach. By announcing a hard military line to stop shipments of weapons from Iran into Iraq, with at least the nominal authority of the Iraqi government, the President can demonstrate some military might against Iran without threatening its territorial sovereignty. Iran can not properly diplomatically object to our targeting Iranians in Iraq who are smuggling weapons across the border; to do so they would have to take responsibility for those smugglers as a government, which they just can't do, diplomatically.

On Mistakes and New Assumptions

The success of most plans depends on the validity of the key assumptions which went into making it. As Rafique noted earlier, much ado has been made about the President "admitting mistakes". I think that's a foolish waste of political time and energy, but the President did it last night, so we'll see if it helps politically or not. What I'd like to look at more closely is the detail of the assumptions and assessments we previously made about the situation in Iraq, and the assumptions made by the new plan. Fortunately, the White House has spelled them out for us in a handy table in its Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review [pdf]. You should, by the way, read the 11 pages of that document all the way through; they're not difficult, and they provide several comparison tables to show the crucial differences between what we were doing and what we will be doing in the future. I reproduce here the key assumptions on page 7 (please pardon the rough formatting; I may try to fix it later):

Conclusion

Like all human undertakings, wars especially, the New Way Forward is fraught with uncertainties and relies on the uncertain future actions of others. There are many ways it could fail. Allowing the U.S. and the Iraqi Security Forces to go after al-Sadr could bring down the government. It could turn the various Shia factions against each other and increase the fighting in the streets. It could anger and scare Iran and Syria sufficiently that they increase, rather than decrease, their aid to various factions within Iraq.

But it could also succeed. Sunnis have shown greater willingness since the beginning of the war to cooperate against al Qaeda insurgents who really want to foment unrest (remember it was surely Sunni insiders who gave us al Zarqawi's location in time to kill him), but the Sunnis want U.S. protection from the Shia militias. The Shia militias want peace amongst themselves for religious reasons even as they fight each other for tribal, religious, and political reasons. Almost everybody wants a unified Iraq rather than see it crumble into 3 mostly autonomous regions. Ordinary Iraqis are really tired of the bloodshed. I am optimistic that the President has listened to people who are getting solid reports of real conditions on the ground, and he is walking a tortuous path as best anybody could. As I noted yesterday, he seems to have worked well with the Iraqi government to get Grand Ayatollah Sistani to support disarming the militias. Sistani's support may be the crucial piece of the puzzle, when combined with the troop surge and the change in the rules of engagement, to smack down the militias.

Several of my cousins are either in Iraq now or will be deployed there very soon, so I have a very personal interest in the success of this new plan, even as it increases the likelihood that my loved ones will be placed in harm's way. I hope and pray that this new way is the right way, and I am optimistic that it is.